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Sanctions – By Way of Introduction
 President Obama in his Now Rouz message to Iranian people:
(20 March 2012; 03:22 minutes)
"...and though times may seem dark, I want you to 
know that I am with you"
 Joe Biden – Paul Ryan TV debate (12 Oct 2012; 02:03 minutes)
"these are the most crippling sanctions in the 
history of sanctions period period"
 William Hague (BBC Persian TV Interview 15 Oct 2012)
“We have no quarrel with the people of Iran”
www.soas.ac.uk/lmei 4 4 December 2013
Sanctions – Early History
 Sanctions defined as deliberate government-inspired withdrawal 
or threat of withdrawal of customary trade, financial 
relationship or seizure of assets
 Economic tool to force a change in foreign policy of a target 
country or to bring about a general change in its behaviour
 Modern comparator is like sending the US fifth fleet to the South China 
Sea to force a devaluation of the Chinese Yuan!
 Old history: first known example is  in 432 BC, when Athens 
sought to choke the economy of the city-state of Megara by 
excluding its merchants from Athenian controlled territories.
 Back then - and often today - sanctions contributed to war (in that case, 
the Peloponnesian War) rather than averting hostility.
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Sanctions – More Recent History
 On the rise especially after the 1990s.
 1914-1990: 115 sanctions (average of 1.6 a year) of which two 
were multilateral UN sanctions (against the then Rhodesia 1966 
and South Africa 1977)
 1990-99: 66 sanctions (over 7 each year)
 Of these two-thirds are US sanctions
 During the Clinton administration alone 35 US sanctions affecting 2.3 
billion people worldwide (42% of the total population) 
 UN sanctions to date: 20 (Sudan, Ethiopia, Iraq, Iran, Al-Qaida, 
etc.).
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UN Sanctions – Article 41
CHAPTER VII: ACTION WITH RESPECT TO THREATS TO THE PEACE, 
BREACHES OF THE PEACE, AND ACTS OF AGGRESSION
 The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use 
of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and 
it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such 
measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of 
economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and 
other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic 
relations
 Despite inflicting intended human distress, sanctions are often 
justified as a more ethical ‘alternative’ to war.
 Prevalent perception that ‘if they are hurting’ they must be 
‘working’.  
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Sanctions – Main Features 
 In most cases imposed by large nations/entities (bullying 
power?)
 Not so common to see San Marino or Luxembourg resort to 
sanctions but the US, EU, UN and the former USSR
 In 80% of cases S > T more than 10 times
 In 50% of cases S > T by 100 times 
 Example: US+EU = 40% of World GDP; Iran = 0.5% so 80 times
 Often high profile sanctions serve important domestic 
political purposes (to appear as if ‘not doing anything’ is not 
an option). 
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Sanctions – Evidence on Effectiveness 
 The most comprehensive study by Hufbauer et al (2007) have 
shown sanctions to be effective one-third of the time (34%)
 This is in terms of achieving their stated objectives. 
 The US political scientist Robert Pape has challenged even this 
measure, claiming that only 5% of these 40 cases can be 
determined genuine successes for sanctions
 Cortright & Lopez (2002) find that successful sanctions capable 
of a threshold damage of 2% of GDP.
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Examples of Successful and Failed Sanctions
Successful examples
 The USA pressed France and Britain to stop the Suez war (1956)
 Iran, Mossadeq era (1953)
 Libya’s decision to renounce WMD in 2003 partly reflected a desire to 
end US sanctions
 South Africa
 Burma? 
Unsuccessful examples : 
 Turkey still in Cyprus after more than 30 years
 Complete failure vis-à-vis the nuclear programme in India, Pakistan and 
of course North Korea
 Iraq?
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‘Success’ – The Determinants
1. Relative size of sender and target
2. Trade linkages
3. Type of Sanctions  
o Trade sanctions
o Financial Sanctions
o Asset Freeze
4. Economic health and political stability in the target country
o Ironically perhaps, successful sanctions are associated with 
relatively more politically stable regimes – not so with dictatorial 
regimes. 
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Success – Some Caveats
What makes for a ‘successful’ sanction begs 
two sub-questions:
1. The real objective/s?
 Explicit vs implicit 
 Varied in nature:   nuclear non-proliferation (Iraq and 
Iran); respect for human rights (Myanmar); 
counterterrorism (Hamas and Al Qaida) and regime 
change (Syria).
2. At what costs?
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Costs
Do means justify ends? (Examples from Iraq)
 Direct or explicit costs
 In Iraq, GDP per capita slashed by 72% 1990-92 and then 
again by 51% 1992-96
 Severe damage to physical and social infrastructure
 Infant mortality doubled 1990-98 (leading to 224,000 
‘additional’ infant deaths)
 Hidden costs: fanning sectarianism as the Baathist regime 
justified the annihilation of civil society institutions
 Unanticipated outcome:
 anarchy and chaos
 Failed state?
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Sanctions – Mechanisms for Change
Two Main mechanisms are assumed or presumed:
1. Hardship  rebellion/revolt or social implosion  regime 
change
2. Regime caves in to pressure  change of behaviour
These however overlook:
 No direct link between the economic and political cycles
 Impact on the elite can be diverted
 Sanctions can actually create rents for and business 
opportunities for some elite
 Ideologue regimes tend have high pain thresholds.
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Some Thoughts on Iran Sanctions
 Objectives: Ostensibly to curtail Iran’s nuclear ambitions and capability
 In reality, the scope of sanctions is much wider if not vaguer:
• Bring Iranian government to the negotiation table?
• Promote democracy and civil rights in Iran?
• Curtail Iran’s regional influence and strategic power?
• Protect Israel’s nuclear monopoly? 
• Regime change?
 Iran nuclear issue a major issue in the US domestic policy 
 Many US sanctions may even be irreversible for years to come because 
they are ‘etched’ in law. 
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Prospects for ‘Success’
 As for Iran: economic costs already very high and the 
burden on civil society has been even higher
 Sanctions not good news for civil liberties groups and the 
movement for reform
 Very little thought given to what if they do not work – what 
afterwards? A last throw of the dice? A measure of 
desperation?
 Sanctions work as ‘collective punishment’: hurting the 
very victims of repressive regimes
 They can promote prospects for civil disintegration and a 
failed state emerging (like in Syria and Iraq).
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‘Success Criteria Revisited in the  
Iranian Context (1)
1. Relative size (already covered)
2. Trade linkages (dependence on oil exports and imports high)
3. Type of Sanctions (comprehensive in scope and number of 
countries signed up)
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‘Success Criteria Revisited in the  
Iranian Context (2)
4. The State of the Domestic Economy and Political Landscape 
(a far more nuanced picture here). 
 Despite Iran's poorly managed economy and well-known 
structural weaknesses, its political scene is not conducive to a 
rapid resolution of the nuclear stand-off.
(a) Ideologue regimes can set a high pain threshold for their 
populations
(b) Iran's complex labyrinth of decision-making and intense factional 
politics thwart easy prospects for an internal solution. 
(c) Sanctions can play into the hands of the most extreme elements 
within a regime and stifling scope for change of behaviour.
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Thoughts on Current Negotiations?
• A rare and historic opportunity to address the issue 
from both sides
• The longer it takes to reach a basic agreement, the 
less likely a final agreement can be attained 
• Costs of failure too high and the setback too costly
• The jury is still out – as we speak...
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Longer Term
• Iran should not be expected to prove its innocence
• Any evidence of wrong doing must be clear and 
unequivocal
• Expecting Iran to abandon enrichment is seen as a breach 
of her sovereignty 
• Is a nuclear Iran as much of a danger as claimed? 
• Rather odd that a nuclear state such as Israel proclaims 
insecurity vis-a-vis a non-nuclear state like Iran
• Agreement must be comprehensive and multilateral (to 
include  other regional players like Turkey, Saudi Arabia, 
Israel etc)
• As John Kerry has stated the resolution of Iran nuclear 
stand-off is not only good for the world but also good for 
Israel and other regional Arab states. 
